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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down a frac-
tured decision in Morse v. Frederick: rejecting a First Amendment-
based
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censor expression that reasonably can be interpreted as promoting and
celebrating illegal drug use.
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legal commentators as very narrow. I n  particular, it  was perceived as
being constricted and limited by both its quirky, if  not unique, set of facts
about the display of a banner conveying the message "Bong Hits 4 Je-
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1.127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law ab r i dg i ng  the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than eight decades ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Writing for the majority in Morse, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded "that schools may
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
1
2 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 32:1:1
SUS914 and by the critical concurring opinion of Justices Samuel Alito and
Anthony Kennedy that provided the five-person majority with two vital
votes.
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Institute, told the Washington Post that "the decision should have a lim-
ited effect because it applies only to student speech that promotes illegal
drug use."
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School Boards' Association, observed that "[Ole court explains this de-
cision is narrowly tailored toward illegal drugs."
7 I n  f a c t ,  t h e  
a t h o r  
o f
this law journal ar icle, along with a colleague, opined in an August 2007
commentary that "the case may be considered a minor VICIOry
schools—limited to the narrow circumstances of  curtailing decidedly
pro-drug messages that lack a political component." 8 I n  a nutshell, the
Morse ruling appeared relatively inconsequential for future student ex-
pression battles, cabined by its peculiar facts.
Such a belief seemed to make perfect sense at the time. The opin-
ion o f  the Court, authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, narrowly
framed the freedom of expression issue before it to be "whether a princi-
pal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at
a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting
gal drug use.'" Roberts focused heavily on how "[d]rug abuse can cause
severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of  young
people,"
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school shootings. He then concluded in an equally narrow fashion "that
schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use."
I I Perhaps more importantly, concurring Justices
vvrote that they joined the fragile majority opinion only
4. See id (describing both the roc
was conveyed).
5. See Bob Egelko, US. Supreme Court; 'Bong Case Limits Student Speech, S.F. CHRON.,
June 26, 2007, at AS (Writing that "legal cornmentators said Monday's mling appeared to be rar-
rowly written").
6. Charles Lane, C ur '  Backs School On Speech Curbs; A 5-4 Majority
, C u e r  P e r i l s  o f  
I l l e g a l
Thugs In Cas  of the 'Hong Hits 4 Jesus' Banner, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at At;
7 TornlIcmrtartn, ELS_ Sig, C , , , ”  CtS' L.3. 2, o i  Schoot's. M o
yon Ma_ Schools, str_ Louis DAN.A
. R E C O R D  
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J u n e  
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2 0 0 7 ,  
a v a i l a
b l e  
a t  
2 0 0
7  
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12164129.
8. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, A Narrow Win for Schools, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 2007, at
9. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
10. M at 2628.
I I. M at 2622.
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on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a
public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would
interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no sup-
port for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on is-
sues such as "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing mari-
juana for medicinal use.
12Flying in the face of such limiting language, however, some lower
federal courts are broadly interpreting the scope of the Morse ruling and,
ironically, the crucial Alito-Kennedy concurrence, to censor speech that
has absolutely nothing to do with illegal drug use but that has everything
to do with subjects such as violence and homophobic expression. Most
notably, in November 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in  Ponce v. Socorro Independent School Dist rict ,
13  r e l i e don what it called "Justice Alito's concurring, and controlling, opinion"
14in Morse to stand for  a very broad, pro-censorship principle—that
"speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave and that derives
that gravity from the 'special danger' to the physical safety of students
arising from the school environment is unprotected."
15 T h e  F i f t h  
C i r c u i t
used its new-fangled, physical-safety principle in Ponce to hold that a
"Morse analysis is  a p p r o p r ia t e "
I 6
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w e l l -
established and more rigorous "substantial disruption"
17 s t a n d a r d  f r o mthe high court's 1969 ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School D is t r ic t
18
— w h e n  
t h e  
s t u d e n t  
s p e e
c h  
a t  
i s s
u e  
" t h r
e a t e
n s  
a
Columbine-style attack
° o n  a  
s c h o o r
m  
T h e  
F i f t
h  
C i r c
i t  
w r o
t e :
12. Id at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
13. 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
14. Id at 768.
15. M at 770.
16. M at 771 n.2.
17. See infra note 18 (setting forth the test created by the United States Supreme Court in Tink-
er v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
18. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protecting the right of public school students to wear black armbands
to school as a form of demonstration against the war in Vietnam and as a call for a truce in that con-
flict). In Tinker, the Court held that schools may censor such individual student displays of political
expression only when there is evidence the speech in question "materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513. The Court concluded
that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities
to forecast substantial disruption of  or material interference with school activities, and no distur-
bances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred." I d  at 514.
19. This is a reference to the April 1999 events at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colo-
rado, that constituted "the most lethal school shooting in history." Matt Bai, Anatomy of a Massa-
cre, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 24. Er ic Harris and Dylan Klebold, members of the so-called
Trenchcoat Mafia at this suburban Denver high school, killed twelve fellow students and one teacher
before taking their own lives. I d  I n  addition, they wounded more than twenty other students and
planted pipe bombs throughout the school that "took days for police to find and defuse." Id.
4 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:1
If school administrators are permitted to prohibit student speech that
advocates illegal drug use because "illegal drug use presents a grave
and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students"
then it defies logical extrapolation to hold school administrators
to a stricter standard with respect to speech that gravely and unique-
ly threatens violence, including massive deaths, to the school popu-
lation as a whole.
21Put differently and more bluntly, the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Ponce allows school administrators to sidestep, avoid, and otherwise
dodge the application of  the Tinker standard when the student speech
threatens mass violence. B y  the court's reasoning, Justice Alito's con-
curring opinion in Morse makes it clear that "some harms are in fact so
great in the school setting that requiring a school administrator to evalu-
ate their disruptive potential is unnecessary."
22 T h e  T i n k e r  
s t a n d a r d ,  
t h e
Fifth Circuit suggested, was simply too complex and/or problematic to
be applied to student expression referencing mass-scale violence. As  it
wrote, Is lchool administrators must be permitted to react quickly and
decisively to address a threat of physical violence against their students,
without worrying that they will have to face years of litigation second-
guessing their judgment as to whether the threat posed a real risk of sub-
stantial disturbance."
23 The years-of-litigation quip may be a thinly veiled reference to the
fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had,
prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, applied the Tinker standard in Morse
to hold principal Deborah Morse personally liable for her decision to pu-
nish student Joseph Frederick for his display of the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus"
banner.
24 
T h e  
N i
n t
h  
C i
r c
u i
t '
s  
r
u
l
i
n
g  
c
a
m
e  
d
o
w
n  
i
n  
M
a
r
c
h  
2
0
0
6
,
2
5  
m
o
r
e
than four years after Frederick unfurled his banner in January 2002.
26
20. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766.
21. Id at 771-72 (citation omitted).
22. Id at 770.
23. Id at 772.
24. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1123-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that principal Deb-
orah Morse violated Frederick's First Amendment rights under the Tinker standard and concluding
that Morse was not entitled to qualified immunity), rev 'd, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). The court stated
that "Frederick's punishment for displaying his banner is best reviewed under Tinker, rather than
Fraser or Kuhlmeier. Tinker requires that, to censor or punish student speech, the school must show
a reasonable concern about the likelihood of substantial disruption to its educational mission." I d  at
1123.
25. Id. at 1114 (identifying the date of the Ninth Circuit's ruling as March 10, 2006).
26. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (identifying January 24, 2002 as the
date when Frederick unfurled his banner as "the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau,
Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah").
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In essence, the Fifth Circuit ripped the narrow concurring opinion
of Justices Afito and Kennedy
27 f r o m  i t s  
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a judicial joyride down a slippery slope of  censorship that allows for
squelching any student speech posing a potential threat to the physical
safety of students. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the Fifth
Circuit is not alone in giving such a broad interpretation to the ruling in
Morse. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, in a July 2007 opinion centering on student speech that refer-
enced violent conduct, wrote:
Recently, in Morse, the Supreme Court broadly held that "Nile spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment and the governmental
interest in stopping student drug abuse a l l o w  schools to restrict
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal
drug use." That same rationale applies equally, i f  not more strong-
ly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat of school violence.
28The Eleventh Circuit's employment of the word "broadly" in the
case o f  Boim v. Fulton County School District to describe the ruling in
Morse seems to be a strategic linguistic device to make the Supreme
Court's reasoning stretch seamlessly from the domain o f  drugs to the
realm of violence. Th is misappropriation o f  the Morse ruling appeared,
however, to bother one member o f  the Eleventh Circuit. Judge Susan
Herrell Black wrote a two-sentence concurring opinion in  Boim to ex-
press her view that Tinker—not Morse—was the correct precedent to
apply. Cit ing  Tinker and writing that she was "applying the Tinker stan-
dard," Black wrote:
Although I agree with the result, I would have limited the inquiry in
this case to whether Rachel Boim's story and the circumstances sur-
rounding it would cause school officials to reasonably anticipate a
substantial disruption of or material interference "with the work of
the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."
29The Morse holding has also been liberally interpreted at the trial
court level. I n  particular, a federal district court in southern California
wrote in February 2008 that Morse "affirms that school officials have a
duty to protect students, as young as fourteen and fifteen years of age,
from degrading acts or expressions that promote injury to the student's
[sic] physical, emotional or psychological well-being and development
which, in  turn, adversely impacts the school's mission to educate
27. See supra text accompanying note 12.
28. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
29. Id. at 985 (Black, J., concurring).
6 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:1
them."" Such an expansive interpretation of  the reasoning in Morse
clearly does not limit the Supreme Court's ruling to speech advocating
illegal drug use, but extends it well beyond to sweep up "degrading acts
or expressions."
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States District Court Judge John A. Houston to be "disparaging of, and
emotionally and psychologically damaging to, homosexual students and
students in the midst of developing their sexual orientation in a ninth
through twelfth grade, public school setting."
32 J u d g e  H o u s t o n  
w r o t e
that "the reasoning in Morse lend  supp rt for a finding that the speech at
issue in the instant case may be properly restricted by school officials if
it is considered harmful."
33 The bottom line is that while some federal judges and courts ac-
knowledge the narrow nature of the holding in Morse,
34 o t h e r s  a r e  e x -pansively interpreting it by choosing to ignore both its idiosyncratic facts
and Justice Alito's very precise, limiting language cited earlier?' The
federal appellate court opinions in both Ponce and Boim reflect a will-
ingness on the part of the judiciary to use Morse as an end-run around
Tinker in order to give public school authorities much broader power and
control in a post-Columbine world to quickly silence student speech that
referenc s violence. This  comes despite the fact that Justice Alito sug-
gested in dicta in Morse that Tinker still controlled in situations involv-
ing the potential for in-school violence, as he wrote that "school officials
must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to violence.
And, in most cases, Tinker's 'substantial disruption' standard permits
school officials to step in before actual violence empts."
36 It was, however, Justice Alito's qualifying use of  the phrase "in
most cases1537 upon which the appellate court in Ponce pounced and
30. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 9, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., Civ. No. 04CV1103 JAH, at 9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.splc.org/pdf/
HarperReconsidered.pdf [hereinafter Harper Reconsideration Order].
31. Id
32. Id See generally, Recent Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2007) (providing background
on Harper case and, in particular, analyzing the 2006 decision in the case by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which a divided panel relied upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Tinker to uphold the school's decision to prohibit the t-shirt in question).
33. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30, at 9.
34. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the holding in Morse
as dealing with speech encouraging illegal drug use); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 602 (6th
Cir. 2007) (Oilman, J., concurring) (describing the Supreme Court's holding in Morse as "a narrow
one"); Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, No. 07-C- 1586, 2007 WL 4569720, at *5
(N.D. 111. Dec. 21, 2007) (writing that Morse "stands for the proposition that opposing the use of
illegal drugs is a sufficient justification for regulating student speech").
35. See supra text accompanying note 12.
36. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
3T1d
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ripped wide open, writing that "Tinker will not always allow school offi-
cials to respond to threats of violence appropriately!'
m I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,ost cases does not mean all cases. This, in turn, means that Morse pro-
vides a new type of exigent-circumstances exception from the stringent
strictures of Tinker. What appears to be happening, then, is that Morse is
being construed not as an opinion about the advocacy of illegal drug use,
but rather as an opinion that is, much more fundamentally and generally,
about two critical and inextricably intertwined concerns in school set-
tings—safety and danger. Morse, viewed in this light, becomes a legal
mechanism for stopping speech, regardless of topic, that jeopardizes the
health and safety of students.
The logic that leads to this liberal interpretation of  Morse goes
something like this:
1 Schools, ideally, should be safe havens from physical dangers,
yet in reality they can be, as Justice Alito wrote, "places of special dan-
ger ."39
2. Illegal drugs pose one such special danger; as Justice Alito rea-
soned, "illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways unique threat
to the physical safety of students:
4D 3. Drugs are not, however, the only threat to the physical safety of
students in public school settings.
4. After "the deadliest school massacre in the nation's history"
41 a tColumbine High School near Littleton, Colorado,
42 a n d  s u b s e q u e n tschool shooting  like the on  in March 2001 in Santee, Califomia,
43 t h e r eis a palpable danger to the physical safety of students posed by the vio-
lent conduct of fellow classmates.
5. Thus, if  speech advocating illegal drug use can be squelched un-
der Morse without having to jump through the legal hoops of Tinker,
then speech that appears to advocate or threaten violence against other
students can similarly be stifled under Morse.
38. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
39. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
40. Id
41. James Brooke, Terror In Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students In Colorado School Said To
Gun Down As Many As 23 And Kill Themselves In A Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al
42. See generally Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School Shooting; Two Student
Gunmen Are Found Dead, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al  (describing the "shooting rampage on
a scale unprecedented in an American school" committed by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold).
43. See generally Todd S. Purdum, Shooting at School Leaves 2 Dead and 13 Hurl, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at Al  (describing how a 15-year-old high school freshman at Santana High
School was the protagonist in "killing 2 fellow students and wounding 13 other people in the worst
episode of school violence since the shootings at Columbine High School in 1999").
8 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:1
Judge Houston's February 2008 opinion in  Harper, described
above," takes this logic one step further, at least to the extent that he
ruled that Morse supports the censorship of speech threatening dangers to
students that are not physical but solely emotional. In  the context of a
school's effort to stop students from wearing clothing carrying anti-
homosexual messages, Houston wrote that "the reasoning in Morse lends
support for a finding that the speech at issue in the instant case may be
properly restricted by school officials i f  it is  considered harmful."
45Surely, as illustrated later by a hypothetical scenario in Part IV of this
Article,
46 
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middle school and high school students, either emotionally or physically,
and this interpretation should additional courts adopt it—gives wide
berth for future censorial efforts by public school administrators.
This Article analyzes and examines the Morse opinion and, in par-
ticular, how it has been interpreted expansively by some courts to the
point where it may someday become the censorship exception that swal-
lows the rule of Tinker. Part II focuses on the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Alito in Morse, paying close attention to the language in his opinion
that the Fifth Circuit seized upon and exploited in Ponce." Part III then
provides greater detail on how Justice Alito's opinion has been used—
arguably, misused and abused—by lower courts in contexts outside of
the realm of speech that advocates illegal drug use.'" More importantly,
Part III argues that the courts that borrowed Morse to justify censorship
of violent expression failed to appreciate a fundamental dichotomy be-
tween distinct types of harms involving public school students—harm to
self versus harm to others. Part III also examines the lingering impact of
the tragedy at Columbine High School on judicial decision making in
student expression cases, noting multiple cases in which Columbine has
been cited by federal judges.
Next, Part IV explores the ramifications of  expansive interpreta-
tions of the Morse ruling. Part IV argues that Morse must be confined
narrowly to its unique facts lest schools become places where concerns
about the harms and dangers of speech silence expression unnecessarily,
rendering student speech sterile and dull, especially when it  otherwise
44. Supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
45. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30, at 9.
46. See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text (setting forth and analyzing a hypothetical
speech controversy involving a student t-shirt emblazoned with the messages "THIN PEOPLE
STINK" and "EAT TRANS FATS").
47. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30, at 9.
48. Infra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
49. Infra notes 79-144 and accompanying text.
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references violence or has the potential to offend others.
513 P a r t  I V  a l s ocreates and sets forth a hypothetical scenari  to demonstrate the elasticity
of Morse, at least as it has been interpreted by some courts, to serve as
legal tool to quell expression far removed from messages advocating il-
legal drug use. Finally, Part V sets forth the Conclusion.
51
DISSECTING THE AUTO CONCURRENCE:
How THE HIGH COURT'S NEWEST MEMBER PAVED THE WAY FOR
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MORSE RULING
Call it a case of TMI (too much information)
52 o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
a
failure to heed both the trial law maxim of "less is more"
53 n d  t h e  " a g e -less adage"
54 o f  
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charitably and less judgmentally, if  Justice Samuel Alito hoped his con-
curring opinion in Morse v. Frederick would be interpreted narrowly by
lower courts, he might not have written so much. Had Justice Alito sim-
ply stated his conclusion in the case and left it at that, rather than at-
tempting to explain it, there would be little legal ground for the appellate
courts in Ponce and Boim to assert and claim that his opinion supports
school efforts to punish students for violent-themed writings.
Justice Alito, in fact, repeatedly attempted to make it exceedingly
clear that his concurrence in Morse was very limited and confined to the
facts of the case. For instance, he wrote: "I join the opinion of the Court
on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special char-
acteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech re-
strictions."
56 
T h e  
s p e
e c h  
r e s
t r i c
t i o n  
i
n  
q u
e s
t i
o n  
i
n  
M
o
r
s
e
,  
o
f  
c
o
u
r
s
e
,
dealt with speech about illegal drug use, and Justice Alito further wrote
hat he joined the majority on the understanding that its opinion "goes no
further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a rea-
sonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use."
57 F i -
50. Infra notes 145-85 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Susan Reimer, Politics and Sex: A Heady Brew, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2008,
at IC ( "[T]he kids have an expression that has no doubt already gone out of general use: TML Too
Much Information.").
53. See Bil l  Allison, Witness Preparation from the Criminal Defense Perspective, 30 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1333, 1339 (1999) ("In the world of trial law, the maxim that 'less is more' is almost
always true. As you formulate your case, you should always be aware that you do not need to over-
prove a point. In fact, there is great danger in doing so.") (emphasis added).
54. Juanda Lowder Daniel, KISS. The Parol Evidence Rule Goodbye: Simplifting The Con-
cept Of Protecting The Parties' Written Agreement, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 231 (2007) (describ-
ing "the ageless adage, 'keep it simple, stupid,' or K.I.S.S. for short").
55. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, A Status Report: Electronic Filing in the Federal
Courts, ALASICA BAR RAG, Jan.—Feb. 2001, at 26.
56. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
57. M at 2636.
10 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:1
nally, as if  those statements were not sufficient to make his point clear,
Justice Alito closed his concurrence by writing that "public schools may
ban speech advocating illegal drug use. But  I regard such regulation as
standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits. I join
the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the opinion does not
endorse any further extension."
58 W h e n  
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Justice Alito's quotations mentioned in this paragraph make it clear that
he did not want his opinion to be used in other factual contexts.
What is more, as if  he anticipated that his opinion might be misap-
plied by lower courts to situations involving violent-themed expression,
Justice Alito wrote that "in most cases, Tinker's 'substantial disruption'
standard permits school officials to  step in  before actual violence
erupts."
59 
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dard for resolving the First Amendment issues in those situations that do
not fall into the "in most cases" category. In any case, even if had he had
articulated a new standard for regulating violent expression in public
schools, such a test would have constituted mere dicta because the case
in Morse had nothing to do with violent expression.
I f  Justice Alito had said no more than all of this, then it is highly
doubtful his concurrence would have been exploited by the courts in
Ponce, Boim, and Harper in very different factual contexts. Unfortu-
nately for free speech advocates, however, Justice Alito wrote a rather
lengthy paragraph in which he laid the foundation for other courts to ex-
pand his concurrence to fit the frameworks of radically different factual
situations. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Ponce called it "[t]he central pa-
ragraph of  Justice Alito's concurring opinion."
60 I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
J u s t i c e
Alito wrote:
[Alny argument for altering the usual free speech rules in the public
schools cannot rest on a theory o f delegation but must instead be
based on some special characteristic of the school setting. The spe-
cial characteristic that is relevant in this case is the threat to the
physical safety of students. School attendance can expose students
to threats to their physical safety that they would not otherwise face.
Outside o f school, parents can attempt to protect their children in
many ways and may take steps to monitor and exercise control over
the persons with whom their children associate. Similarly, students,
when not in school, may be able to avoid threatening individuals
and situations. During school hours, however, parents are not pre-
sent to provide protection and guidance, and students' movements
58. Id. at 2638 (emphasis added).
59. Id
60. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 2007).
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and their ability to choose the persons with whom they spend time
are severely restricted. Students may be compelled on a daily basis
to spend time at close quarters with other students who may do
them harm. Experience shows that schools can be places of special
danger.
°It is important to break this paragraph down into two components in
order to more fully understand it and to comprehend why it is being ex-
ploited by lower courts. Initially , Justice Alito's reference to the "usual
free speech rules in the public schools"
62 a p p a r e n t l y  
r e f e r s  
t o  
t h e  
S u -
preme Court's trio of pre-Morse decisions affecting the speech and press
rights of public school s t u d e n t s
6 3
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t y  
I n -
dependent School Dist rict ,
64  B e t h e l  
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t  
N o .  
4 0
3  
v .  
F r a s e
r ,
6 5
and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
66 S u m m a r i z i n g  
t h e  
h o l d -
ings in these three cases, Justice Alito wrote earlier in his Morse concur-
rence that Tinker "permits the regulation of student speech that threatens
a concrete and 'substantial disruption,'"
67 w h i l e  F r a s e r  
" p e r m i t s  
t h e  
r e g -
ulation of spe ch that is delivered in a lewd or vulgar manner as part of a
middle school program,"
68 a n d  
K u h l m e i e r  
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what is in essence the school's own speech, that is, articles that appear in
a p blication that is an official school organ."
69 Second, according to Justice Alito, any judicial exception to the
ules established in this aging trio of cases, must be grounded in a "spe-
61. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
62. M
63. See generally DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAW 95 (2009-2010 ed.
2008) (writing that "prior to 2007, there was a trilogy of Supreme Court cases (Tinker, Hazelwood
and Bethel), each with its own rules and guidelines, that public schools may use to squelch the
speech rights of students," and providing a summary of the rules created in those three cases).
64. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding the right of students to wear black armbands emblazoned
with peace signs in order to protest the war in Vietnam and to call for a truce over the winter holi-
days; protecting student expression unless there is a real reason to believe it will cause a substantial
and material disruption of the educational atmosphere or interference with the rights of other stu-
dents; and noting that an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression).
65. 478 U.S. 675, 675-85 (1986) (allowing a school to punish a student who made a sexually
suggestive speech to a captive audience of fellow students during a student-government assembly,
and holding that "it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse" because to allow such speech would "undermine the
school's basic educational mission").
66. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing school authorities to censor school-sponsored speech and
speech that is part of the curriculum, such as a school-sponsored student newspaper, i f the school's
reasons for censorship are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
67. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines bide!). Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
68. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
69. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988)).
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cial characteristic of the school setting,"
76 s u c h  a s  
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ical safety of students."
7I F o r  
J u s t i c e  
A l i t o ,  
s u c
h  
s c h o o l
-
g r o u n d  
t h r
e a t
s
to physical safety seem omnipresent, as he wrote that "[e]xperience
shows that schools can be places of special danger"
72 b e c a u s e  s t u d e n t s"may b  compelled on a daily basis to spend time at close quarters with
other students who may do them harm."
73 The threat to the physical safety of students at issue in Morse was
the use o f  illegal drugs, something that Justice Alito described as "a
grave and in many ways unique threat"
74 t h a t  i s  " j u s t  
a s  
s e r i o u s ,  
i f  
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always as immediately obvious"
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acts of violence, the tried-and-true Tinker standard allows school offi-
cials, "in most cases,"
77 t o  s t e p  
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izing. As  the next part of this Article explains, however, the phrase "in
most cases" provides the ideal entrée for using Justice Alito's language
in the paragraph quoted above
78 t o  m a k e  
f u r t h e r  
e x c e p t i o n s
—
x c e p t i o n s
beyond those applicable cases in which the speech at issue advocates
illegal drug use—to the Tinker precedent.
I I I .  ABUSING MORSE, EVOKING COLUMBINE: THE COUPLING OF JUSTICE
ALITO'S CONCURRENCE WITH MEMORIES OF LITTLETON
A. Abusing Morse: How Lower Courts Expansively Interpret the Case
This section examines three different cases that have broadly inter-
preted the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Morse v. Frederick to
apply in contexts other than those in which the speech in question advo-
cates illegal drug use.
1. Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District
79The speech at issue in Ponce was "an extended notebook diary,
written in the first-person perspective,"
m i n  w h i c h  i t s  
s t u d e n t  
a u t h o r ,  
a
sophomore at Montwood High School in El Paso, Texas, described the
70. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638.
71. Id
72.M
73. Id
74. Id
75. M
76. See supra text accompanying note 59.
77. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Mho, J., concurring).
78. See supra text accompanying note 61.
79. 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
80. Id at 766.
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"creation of a pseudo-Nazi group"
81 a t  h i s  
h i g h  
s c h o o l .  
A c c o r d i n
g  
t o  
t h e
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the diary, which its
author claimed was " a  wo rk o f  fict ion ,"
82  d e t a i l e d  t h e  
p s e u d o - N a z i
group's
plan to  commit a "[C]olumbine shooting" attack on Montwood
High School or a coordinated "shooting at all the [district's] schools
at the same time." A t  several points in the journal, the author ex-
presses the feeling that his "anger has the best of [him]" and that "it
will get to the point where [he] will no longer have control." The
author predicts that this outburst will occur on the day that his close
friends at the school graduate.
83The student, identified in the opinion only by the initials EP., was
suspended fo r three days after the school's assistant principal, Jesus
Aguirre, concluded that the "writ ing posed a 'terroristic threat' to  the
safety and security o f  the students and the campus."
84 A f t e r  E . P . ' s  
p a r -
ents filed a lawsuit against the school district claiming the suspension
violated the First Amendment right o f  free speech, U.S. District Court
Judge Kathleen Cardone in May 2006—more than a year prior to the
Supreme Court's ruling in  Morse—applied the substantial-and-material
disruption standard created b y the Supreme Court in  Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District .
85  J u d g e  C a r d o n e  
r u l e d
in favor o f  the student and against the school, concluding that the school
had failed "its burden in demonstrating a reasonable belief that [the stu-
dent's] expression would materially and substantially interfere with the
operation of the school."
86 A m o n g  
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as militating against the school and in  favor o f  E.P. was the fact that
Aguirre, immediately after deeming the notebook to constitute a threat to
the student body, onetheless sent E.P. back to class to complete the
school day. Judge Cardone observed:
[ lit  makes no sense to this Court that an administrator who genu-
inely believes that a student constitutes a threat to the general stu-
dent population, would then send that student back into the general
student population immediately following the discovery of that stu-
dent's plan to commit an attack against the school. I f  anything, this
81. Id
82. Id T he student's mother also "maintained that the notebook was fiction, and explained
that she also engaged in creative writing." Id. at 767.
83. Id. at 766.
84. Id. at 767.
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
86. Ponce v. Socorro bade!). Sch. Dist., 432 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (WAD. Tex. 2006), vacated,
508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).
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would appear to allow that student the perfect opportunity to carry
out his plans or at least a portion thereof-before further action could
be taken to stop him. However, the facts indicate that E.P. returned
to class without incident, supporting E.P.'s argument that the story
was, indeed, fiction.
87Judge Cardone further blasted Aguirre's characterization of E.P.'s
speech as a terroristic threat, writing:
[Iln light of E.P.'s explanation of the notebook as a dramatic mono-
logue, E.P.'s subsequent action (or more precisely inaction) after
being sent back into class after discovery of his notebook, his lack
of a disciplinary record, and his subsequent good behavior while at-
tending a private school for the entirety of this past year, Aguirre's
summary conclusion apRears to be no more than mere intuition or asimple pronouncement.
It is important to remember that Judge Cardone made her decision
before the Supreme Court ruled in Morse v. Frederick. Thus, Tinker was
clearly the logical rule for her to adopt and to apply. Why? First, it was
not controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier
89 b e c a u s e  
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ther was part o f  th  school curriculum or that was sponsored by the
school. Similarly, it was not controlled by the high court's ruling in Be-
thel School District No. 403 v. Fraser"  because there was, as Judge Car-
done noted, no evidence to suggest E.P.'s notebook contained sexually
lewd, offensive, or vulgar language like that at issue in Fraser.
91 By the time the case worked its way up to the Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, the Supreme Court had ruled in Morse. This would prove pivotal.
The appellate court took full advantage of the Morse ruling to find a way
around both Tinker and Judge Cardone's application of the Tinker rule.
To this extent, the unanimous three-judge panel in Ponce wrote that "we
are guided by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morse v. Freder-
ick ."
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specifically criticized or otherwise even commented on the substantive
reasoning, logic, and analysis of Judge Cardone under Tinker.
To effectively evade and avoid the strictures of Tinker, the Fifth
Circuit opined that the limits of censorship and school authority over
student speech that could result in violence "are often, but not always,
87. Id at 696.
88. M at 697.
89. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
90.478 U.S. 675 (1986).
91. Ponce, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 693-94.
92. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007).
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adequately determined by Tinker."
93 I n  s u p p o r t  
o f  t h e  
p r o p o s i t i
o n  
t h a t
there may be instances when Tinker is inadequate and does not apply, the
Fifth Circuit directly quoted Justice Alito's statement in Morse that Tink-
er "in most cases p e r m i t s  school officials to step in before actual vio-
lence empts."
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ing through a tiny seam in the defensive line and then exploding down-
field for a touchdown, the Fifth Circuit seized the opportunity provided
by Justice Alito's use of the phrase "most cases" and ran with it to reach
its goal line conclusion that "Tinker will not always allow school offi-
cials to respond to threats of violence appropriately."
95 T h e  l o g i c  h e r egoes something like this: the word "most" means "usually," which does
not mean "always," which, in turn, means that there must be some cases
when Tinker simply will not suffice or work.
And what are those cases? They are the ones when, as the Fifth
Circuit wrote, the speech poses the "harm of a mass school shooting."
96In these instances, the appellate court reasoned, a "Morse analysis is ap-
propriate"
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that Justice Alito focused on in his concurrence—namely, the "grave
harms arising from the particular character of the school setting."
98 T h eFifth Circuit quoted, in italics for emphasis and which was cited earlier
in Part 11,
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schools can be places of special danger."
°° T h e  c o u r t  
r e a s o n e d  
t h a t  
i f
speech about illegal drug use can be censored under Morse due to the
physic l harm drugs cause, "then it defies logical extrapolation to hold
school administrators to a stricter standard with respect to speech that
gravely and uniquely threatens violence, including massive deaths, to the
school population as a whole."
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t y p e  o f  
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l o g i
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a n
d
reasoning allowed the appellate court to conclude that E.P.'s "journal's
threatening language is not protected by the First Amendment"
m2 a n dthat the school's action against him "violated no protected r ight."
03
93. Id at 770 (emphasis added).
94. Id (emphasis added) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007) (Auto, J.,
concurring)).
95. M
96. M at 771 n.2.
97. Id
98. Id at 770.
99. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
100. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770 (emphasis in original) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct.
2618, 2638 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)).
101. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772.
102. M
103. M
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The bottom line from Ponce is that the Fifth Circuit used Justice
Alito's concurring opinion in Morse to fashion a very broad rule that al-
lows for in-school censorship. I n  particular, the court wrote that "[t]he
concurring opinion [in Morse] m a k e s  explicit that which remains la-
tent in the majority opinion: speech advocating a harm that is demonstra-
bly grave and that derives that gravity from the 'special danger' to the
physical safety of students arising from the school environment is unpro-
tected."
104 But such an extrapolation from Morse of a new censorship rule cen-
tering on "physical safety" and "danger" is  off-base and misguided.
Why? Because the locus of the harm is very different with illegal drug
use than it is with violence. I n  a nutshell, the problem with illegal drug
use by a high school student involves harm to self—harm to the student
who engages in the illegal conduct. In  contrast, the problem with illegal
violence committed by a high school student involves harm to others—
the students who fall victim to the actor that engages in the violent con-
duct.
Put differently, the use of illegal drugs threatens the physical safety
of the individual students who engage in the dangerous conduct them-
selves: drugs are dangerous to those who use them. The actors—the stu-
dents engaging in the drug use—inflict injury upon themselves by inject-
ing, snorting, inhaling, or otherwise consuming illegal drugs.
With violence, however, the threat posed to physical safety is very
different. The primary underlying concern of the school officials in cas-
es like Ponce is with the physical safety not of the actors—not of the stu-
dents who allegedly would engage in the shooting, bombing, maiming
and killing—but rather with the safety of the other students who would
come into contact with the actors and be harmed by them.
To put it bluntly, a student who shoots up drugs harms himself, a
student who shoots up a school harms others. This  not so insignificant
difference between the locus of harm went unmentioned in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Ponce.
The ignored—more charitably, overlooked—dichotomy between
harm to self versus harm to others also suggests that the appellate court
in Ponce failed to understand and appreciate the difference between the
concerns with the speech at issue in Morse and the speech at issue in
Ponce. I n  Morse, the concern with the speech of student Joseph Freder-
ick is that his banner might influence other students to engage in illegal
drug use and thereby to harm themselves. It is, then, a question of mes-
104. Id at 770.
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sage effects: that message X (the admonishment to use illegal drugs)
I135will influence others to engage in harmful conduct Y (consumption of
illegal drugs). As  Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Morse majority,
the concern in that case was that Frederick's speech was "promoting ille-
gal drug use."
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Joseph Frederick.
In Ponce, however, there was no concern in any way about the in-
fluence of the student speech on others; E.P. was not promoting the ille-
gal use of violence by his fellow students. Officials at Montwood High
School were not concerned that E.P.'s message in his notebook diary
would somehow influence other students to engage in violence. Ponce
simply is not a case about the potential influence of message X (the stu-
dent notebook diary) on the conduct of other students. Rather, the con-
cern of school authorities is that the writing in question is a direct mani-
festation of intent by its student-author to engage in the conduct him-
self—that E.P. might, as the Fifth Circuit wrote, engage in "physical vio-
lence against their students."
107 T h a t  
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o n  
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the speec  of E.P.
In brief, then, the speech of Joseph Frederick is censored because it
might influence other students to engage in illegal conduct, while the
speech of E.P. is censored because it supposedly reveals his state of mind
to engage in his own illegal conduct. This difference apparently was lost
on the appellate court in Ponce, which instead conflated harm to self
with harm to others, while simultaneously ignoring the distinction be-
tween censoring speech because of its potential influence on others' con-
duct versus censoring speech because of what it reveals about the speak-
er's own state of mind.
In summary, these differences suggest that the Fifth Circuit erred in
stretching the Morse holding to apply to a very different situation involv-
ing very different harms in Ponce. As  the next case illustrates, however,
the appellate court in Ponce is not the only court to make this mistake.
2. Boim v. Fulton County School Dis tr ic t
imIn October 2003—more than three years prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Morse v. Frederick—high school student Rachel
105. Indeed, the majority opinion in Morse concluded that this was a reasonable interpretation
of the meaning of Joseph Frederick's banner, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the "Bong Hits 4
Jesus" message "could be interpreted as an imperative: ' [Take] bong hits ' — a  message equiva-
lent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to 'smoke marijuana' or 'use an illegal drug." Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007).
106. M at 2629.
107. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772 (emphasis added).
108.494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Boim was suspended from Roswell High School.
m9 W h a t  l a n d e d  
B o i m
in trouble was an entry in a notebook in which she penned the following
fantasy scenario about killing her math teacher:
[fi]e starts taking role [sic]. Yes, my math teacher. I lothe [sic] him
with every bone in my body. Why? I  dont [sic] know. This is it. I
stand up and pull the gun from my pocket. BANG the force blows
him back and every one in the class sits there in shock. BANG he
falls to the floor and some one [sic] lets out an ear piercing_ scream.
Shaking I put the gun in my pocket and run from the room.
1
"
)
On July 31, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit held that school officials did not violate Boim's First
Amendment right of free expression when they punished her for the ab-
ovementioned passage." Apply ing the Tinker standard, the appellate
court wrote that Boim's writing in her notebook, which she passed to a
fellow student during the period immediately before her math class was
scheduled to meet, "clearly caused and was reasonably likely to further
cause a material and substantial disruption to the 'maintenance of order
and decorum' within""  her school.
Had the Eleventh Circuit stopped its analysis there—ended it  by
applying Tinker and leaving it at that—the decision would be less prob-
lematic for free speech proponents.
The appellate court, however, chose to go beyond Tinker to use the
then-brand new Morse opinion to bolster its conclusion. I t  wrote:
In our view, it is imperative that school officials have the discretion
and authority to deal with incidents like the one they faced in this
case. Recently, in  Morse, the Supreme Court broadly held that
"[t]he special characteristics of the school environment and the gov-
ernmental interest in stopping student drug abuse. . . allow schools
to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promot-
ing illegal drug use." Tha t  same rationale applies equally, i f  not
more stronfly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat of schoolviolence.' I
The Eleventh Circuit 's logic here, as reflected by the concluding
sentence of this quotation, mirrors that of the Fifth Circuit's "IF, THEN"
reasoning in Ponce: I f  school officials have the power and authority un-
der Morse to squelch speech promoting the harms wrought by student
109. Id at 980-82.
110. Id at 980-81.
111. Id at 984.
112.M at 983.
113. Id at 984 (citation omitted).
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drug abuse, then surely they can stop speech threatening the harms
caused by school violence. And just like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit made no effort to unpack and analyze the differences between the
harms in question; there was no distinction made by the court between
the harm to self caused by illegal drug use and the harm to others caused
by student violence. There is, in fact, a very different rationale—not "the
same rationale,"
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dent for speech because that speech might influence others to engage in
harmful illegal conduct (drug use) and, in contrast, punishing a student
for sp ech b cause that speech reveals her state of mind about possibly
committing harmful acts against others (in Boim, a math teacher). The
power of Joseph Frederick's words resided in their supposed ability to
influence and to motivate other students to try drugs. I n  stark contrast,
the power of Rachel Boim's words lay simply in their ability to alert
school officials to the supposed harmful intentions of their author. Given
that Morse is, factually speaking, decidedly distinct from Boim, it would
seem that, at the very least, some effort would have been made to ana-
lyze and analogize the harms in question. Even more troubling, perhaps,
is the fact the Eleventh Circuit completely ignored and failed to cite Jus-
tice Alito's language that narrowly limited the scope of his concurrence
to the unique facts of the case."'
3. Harper v. Poway Unified School Dis t ric t
i l6In both Ponce and Boim, two different federal appellate courts
found that the ruling in Morse supported suppression and punishment not
only of speech advocating the use of illegal drugs but also of student ex-
pression referencing and allegedly portending violent in-school conduct.
Subsequent to those two decisions, United States District Judge John A.
Houston, sitting in southern California within the liberal-leaning United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, took the Morse ruling a
giant step further to hold that it  supported the suppression of  a com-
pletely intangible injury—namely, emotional distress suffered by stu-
dents who are the targets of homophobic expression. The case, which
continues on appeal today,
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school that carried the message "Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (citing Alito's language limiting the scope
of his concurring opinion).
116. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30.
117. On March 25, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their opening br ief appealing Judge Houston's
ruling. See Appellant's Opening Brief, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07-55224 (9th Cir.
Mar. 25, 2008), available at http://www.telladforg/UserDocs/HarperBriefpdf (last visited Jul. 8,
2008) [hereinafter Harper Appellant's Br.].
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What God Has Condemned" on the front and "Homosexuality Is Shame-
ful 'Romans 1:27" on the back .
118 J u d g e  
H o u s t o n  
w r o t e  
i n  
F e b r u a
r y
2008:
Morse a f fi r m s  that school officials have a duty to protect stu-
dents, as young as fourteen and fifteen years of age, from degrading
acts or expressions that promote injury to the student's physical,
emotional or psychological well-being and development which, in
turn, adversely impacts the school's mission to educate them.
I19Adding that "this Court agrees with defendants that the reasoning
presented in Morse lends support for a finding that the speech at issue in
the instant case may properly be restricted by school officials if  it is con-
sidered harmful,"
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the physical harm caused by an individual's own use of drugs (the danger
in M rse) with the emotional injury caused by viewing another's use of
speech conveyed on a T-shirt. These are radically different types of in-
jury—physical versus emotional—that are brought about in very differ-
ent ways—inhaling a substance versus reading a statement. I n  Morse,
the danger of the speech is posed by its alleged ability to influence stu-
dents to use illegal drugs, thereby harming their health, while in Harper
the danger of the speech lies in its power to harm those who view it sim-
ply by reading its message — the reader of the T-shirt does not, unlike in
Morse, need to engage in any further conduct for the harm to occur. Put
more simply: In Morse, the logic is " if view message, then will try drugs,
and then will be physically harmed," while in Harper the logic for sup-
pression is " i f  view message, then will be emotionally harmed." I t  is
quite a long legal leap to extend the reasoning in Morse to a case of cen-
sorship of what some might consider homophobic speech.
Viewed collectively and most liberally, the decisions in Ponce,
Boim, and Harper illustrate that the Supreme Court's Morse opinion will
be used by some courts to support suppression of any speech that could
result in any harm to students. In Ponce and Boim, that harm is physical
violence. I n  Harper, the harm is emotional anguish. But  as the plain-
tiffs  attorneys in Harper contended in their March 2008 brief to the
United States Court of  Appeal for the Ninth Circuit appealing Judge
Houston's ruling, Morse only "allows schools to restrict non-political
speech that is  reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug USe."
121Whether other courts choose to ignore this narrow construction of the
118. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30, at 2.
119.1d at 9.
120. M
121. Harper Appellant's Br., supra note 117, at 22.
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holding in Morse remains to be seen. The next section of this Article
suggests, however, that judicial remembrance of the killings at Colum-
bine High School provides the real-world context for allowing courts to
ignore Justice Alito's repeated effor ts
122 t o  n a r r o w l y  
f r a m e  
t h e  
r e a c h  
o f
Morse.
B. Columbine on the Mind: A Tragedy's Influence on Free Expression
At the heart of the decisions in cases like Ponce and Boim lies the
influence on jurists o f  real-world acts o f  savage violence committed
against students in the nation's public school system during the past ten
years. This is not mere speculation. Indeed, if  the events of September
11, 2001, forever changed the way many Americans think about issues
like national security and international terrorism, then the events of April
20, 1999, at Columbine High School forever changed the way both pub-
lic school officials and federal- and state-court judges perceive and inter-
pret student writings that make reference to violence and bloodshed.
I23 David Hudson, a staff attorney with the First Amendment Center,
wrote in 2001 that "[Ole discretion granted school administrators has
increased substantially in the wake of several high-profile school shoot-
ings, most particularly the tragedy at Columbine High School."
124 T h eauthor of this article observed in a 2001 piece that, in some controversies
that took place shortly after the tragedy at Columbine, "students' First
Amendment speech rights were trounced not only by schools that ex-
pelled them, but by courts that refused to protect them."
125 Hudson and the author of this article are not alone in expressing
such sentiments. Dr . Nan Stein, a senior research scientist at Wellesley
College, wrote in a 2003 law journal article:
Welcome to the post-Columbine world o f  schools. Students are
controlled in ways that shred the U.S. Constitution and the Bill o f
Rights: they have been suspended retroactively for papers they have
written, thoughts they have had, and for drawings. I n  other cases,
young elementary-aged school children have been suspended for
122. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing Justice Alito's efforts to limit
the scope of the Morse opinion).
123. C I  Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check
Your Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739 (2000) (providing
examples of censorship of student expression in the immediate wake of the killings at Columbine
High School in April 1999).
124. David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of  Diminishing
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 199, 200 (2000),
available at 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199.
125. C lay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship o f  the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 245 (2001).
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comments they made in the heat of a touch football game or when
the teacher would not permit them to go to the bathroom, which the
administrators decided to take as death threats.
126Stein's observations proved still valid four years later in 2007. I n
Ponce, the appellate court wrote that it considered the case in light of
what it called "violence bearing the stamp of a well-known pattern of
recent historic activity: mass, systematic school-shootings in the style
that has become painfully familiar in the United States."
127 T h e  P o n c ecourt added that "[o]ur recent history demonstrates that threats of an at-
tack on a school and its students must be taken seriously.19128
Similarly, in ruling in favor of school authorities and against the
student expression at issue in Boim, the Eleventh Circuit specifically
cited the "climate of increasing school v iolence."
129 T h e  c o u r t  
a l s o  e m -
phasized t at "in the eight years preceding the incident underlying the
instant appeal, there had been 10 well-known, student-perpetrated shoot-
ings in schools, not including college campuses."
30 W h a t ' s  m o r e ,  
t h e
Eleventh Circuit noted for the record that the high school principal (a
defendant in the case) was "concerned primarily about the threatening
undertones of [the student's] narrative in light of the massacre that oc-
curred at Columbine High School in Colorado, [and] the much more lo-
cal shooting that occurred at Heritage High School in Conyers, Geor-
Pre-dating these two post-Morse cases, other federal appellate
courts also made use of real-life instances of school violence to justify —
or, at least, to support — its pro-censorship rulings. For  instance, in the
Eighth Circuit's 2002 ruling in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School
Dis tr ic t,
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rights of a student who described in a "letter how he would rape, sodom-
ize, and murder a female classmate who had previously broken up with
him,"
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umbine and Jonesboro that any reasonable school official who came into
possession of  [the student's] letter would not have taken some action
based on its violent and disturbing content."
126. Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment? The Missing Discourse of Rights in an Era of
Zero Tolerance, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 783, 792 (2003).
127. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist, 508 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2007).
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
129. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007).
130.M at 983.
131.M. at 981.
132.306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
133.M. at 619.
134. Id at 626 n.4.
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Similarly, in La Vine v. Blaine School Dis tr ic t
135 t h e  N i n t h  
C i r c u i t
held that school authorities did not violate the rights of a student when it
expelled him for writing a poem that suggested its writer might engage in
violence. In  its opinion, the Ninth Circuit wrote that the case before it
arises against a backdrop of tragic school shootings, occurring both
before and after the events at issue here, and requires us to evaluate
through a constitutional prism the actions school officials took to
address what they perceived was the student's implied threat of vio-
lent harm to himself and others. Given the knowledge the shoot-
ings at Columbine, Thurston and Santee high schools, among oth-
ers, have imparted about the potential for school violence (as rare as
these incidents may be when taken in context), we must take care
when evaluating a student's First Amendment right o f free expres-
sion against school officials' need to provide a safe school envi-
ronment not to overreact in favor of either.
136The influence of Columbine and similar school tragedies is also felt
at the trial court level. F o r  instance, in  Governor Wentworth Regional
School District v. Hendrickson,
137 J u d g e  
S t e v e n  
J .  
M c A u l i f f
e  
r u l e
d  
i n
favor o f school authorities and against a student who refused to remove
from his clothing a so-called "No Na zis"
I 3 8  p a t c h .  I n  
r e a c h i n g  
t h a t  
p r o -
school conclusion, Judge McAuliffe wrote that " it  is undeniable that the
eruption o f  fatal violence at Columbine High School and other public
schools casts a pragmatic shadow on what otherwise might be viewed as
rimarily an academic disagreement."
139 More recently, in  May 2008, United States District Court Judge
William C. Connor wrote that "the threat o f  serious school violence—
including mass shootings perpetrated by students—is an unfortunate fact
of life in twenty-first century America . "
140  H e  a p t l y  
s u m m e d  
u p  
t h e  
j u -
dicial reaction to this disturbing reality, writing that "the overwhelming
response has been deference on the part of courts to the judgment of edu-
cators as to whether a perceived threat should be taken seriously and met
with discipline in order to ensure the safety of the school community. '041
135. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 959 (2002).
136. Id. at 983.
137. 421 F. Supp. 2d 410 (DNA. 2006), vacated as moot, No. 06-1652, 2006 W L 3259203
(1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2006).
138.1d at 411.
139.M
140. Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 07 Civ. 10996, 2008 WL 1990788, at *3 (S.DN.Y.
May 5, 2008).
141. Id. at *4.
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Not surprisingly, Judge Connor cited the federal appellate court opinions
in both Ponce and Boim in support of this proposition.
I42 In addition, the events at Columbine have influenced Fourth
Amendment-based
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judge in Texas in 2001, in ruling against a student's search-and-seizure
claims, wrote:
Mil the aftermath of the Columbine High violence, some period of
hypersensitivity among schools officials was called for, and indeed
should be lauded. I n  the face of a genuine nationwide tragedy,
which has been mimicked at other schools, and with which we all
therefore continue to struggle, it simply is not improper to overre-
ac t.
' 'At a minimum, this quotation suggests that Columbine provides
some breathing space or slack for school authorities when it comes to
intruding on constitutional rights in realms other than free speech. The
bottom line is that the jurisprudence concerning the rights of minors in
educational settings continues to operate in the long shadow cast by Col-
umbine High School.
IV. A VERY SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CENSORSHIP:
SEARCHING FOR LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF MORSE UNDER THE
REASONING IN PONCE, BOIM, AND HARPER
The trio of post-Morse federal court opinions described in Section
A of Part II makes it clear that some judges are willing to expansively
view the Supreme Court's ruling in Morse beyond its factual underpin-
nings and, in doing so, to extend its logic and reasoning to support the
censorship of speech threatening physical violence and expression caus-
ing emotional injury. Thus, the issue arises whether there are any limits
on just how far these or other courts may go in stretching Morse beyond
the realm of speech advocating the use of illegal drugs.
In Ponce, the Fifth Circuit suggested that, indeed, Morse would not
necessarily apply to any and all situations in  which student speech
threatens violence. I n  particular, the Fifth Circuit drew a rather strange
dichotomy regarding speech portending violence—a dichotomy between
142. M
143. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
144. Stockton v. City of Freeport, 147 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647-48 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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threats that "are relatively discrete in scope and directed at adults"
145 a n dthose that threaten "a mass school shooting.„146 In  the former scenario,
the appellate court in Ponce suggested that the Tinker standard
147 w o u l dbe appropriate for determining whether censorship of speech and pun-
ishment of its student speaker/author were constitutional.'” In  the latter
scenario, however, the court argued that Morse was the correct standard
to apply .
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ers "do not amount to the heightened level of harm that was the focus of
both the majority opinion and Justice Alito's  concurring opinion in
Morse. The harm of a mass school shooting is, by contrast, so devastat-
ing and so particular to schools that a Morse analysis is appropriate."
150 It is simultaneously remarkable and disconcerting to believe that
the level of constitutional protection student speech receives is largely
dependent, not only on the number of potential victims and deaths to
which the expression at issue alludes, but also on the identity of those
potential victims But  this is precisely the case under Ponce:
• I f  you threaten the life of a specific teacher, then your speech
will receive heightened protection under Tinker.
• I f  you threaten the lives of many students, then your speech will
be summarily punished under Morse.
Implicit, although perhaps not intended, in the Fifth Circuit's logic
is the notion that some lives—those of students – are worth more than
those of other people, namely teachers. The appellate court, in essence,
is placing values on human life with its bastardized, post-Morse First
Amendment calculus.
What's more, there is a vagueness
151 i s s u e  p o s e d  
b y  
t h e  
F i f t h  
C i r -
cuit's use o f  the phrase "relatively discrete in scope and directed at
adults "
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speech in question is better measured against the strictures of Tinker than
145. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007).
146. M
147. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the rule articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Tinker).
148. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771 n.2.
149. Id
150.M
151. See generally Grayned vo City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (providing, in perti-
nent part, that "i t is a basic principle of  due process that an enactment is void for vagueness i f its
prohibitions are not clearly defined" and that "we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly"); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 910 (2d ed. 2002) ("[A] law is
unconstitutionally vague i f  a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is
permitted. Unduly vague laws violate due process whether or not speech is regulated.").
152. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771 n.2 (emphasis added).
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Morse. In  particular, the appellate court fails to articulate how precisely
limited or minor the threatened carnage must be in order for it to consti-
tute violence that is "relatively discrete in scope."
153 G i v e n  t h a t  
a n y
murder in any school is headline-making news, it is inconceivable how
ny school shooting could ever be considered truly discrete.
In addition, the appellate court fails to consider whether a student
letter threatening more than two or three "adults "
154 w o u l d  b e  
b e t t e r  a n a -
lyzed under Tinker. I n  other words, how many adults must be targeted
y a student l tter or a notebook like the kind at issue in Ponce before
Morse—rather than Tinker—comes into play? Or  does it, in fact, make
any difference in terms of the number of adults targeted? Is  Morse sim-
ply a ruling limited to scenarios in which the speech at issue references
violence targeting students?
The Fifth Circuit suggested that this could well be the case—that
Morse is  merely a  harm-to-students rule—when i t  concluded that
"speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave and that derives
that gravity from the 'special danger' to the physical safety of students
arising from the school environment is unprotected."
155 I t  i s  t h e  s a f e t y  
o f
students, in other words, that justifies the application of Morse, in the
eyes of the Fifth Circuit. The safety of teachers and/or staff, conversely,
was never addressed in Morse and, thus, presumably is handled under
Tinker. This muddle and morass, based on faulty dichotomies, illustrates
the danger when a lower court elects to expansively interpret—indeed,
expansively modify—Supreme Court precedent to fi t a very different
factual scenario involving a very different harm.
While Ponce at least attempts to put parameters on the scope of
Morse, the courts in Boim and Harper fail to do so altogether. Impor-
tantly, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in an April 2008 opinion authored by the prominent Judge Richard
Posner, made it  clear that Morse's scope is limited, at least when it
comes to squelching speech that supposedly threatens violence. I n  par-
ticular, in Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204,
Judge Posner wrote that "[v]iolence was not the issue in Morse."
156 T h i srecognition by Judge Posner that violence had nothing to do with the le-
gal question in Morse seems to put the Seventh Circuit in direct conflict
with both the Fifth Circuit, which used Morse in Ponce to suppress stu-
dent speech referencing violence,' 57 as well as the Eleventh Circuit,
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
156. 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
157. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Ponce).
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which also used Morse's logic to suppress the violent-themed writing of
Rachel Boim.
158 
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did precious little to calm what one federal appellate court not too long
ago aptly called "the unsettled waters of  free speech rights in public
schools, waters rife with rocky shoals and uncertain currents."
I59 Although appearing to slam the door shut on the use of Morse to
squelch violent-themed expression, the Seventh Circuit in Nitwit seem-
ingly left it  wide open on whether Morse could be used to suppress
speech that causes psychological harm stemming from messages like the
one at issue in Harper.
16c1 I n  
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clothing displaying what many people would consider an anti-gay mes-
sage; in Nuxoll, the object of school officials' ire was a T-shirt embla-
zoned with the phrase, "Be Happy, Not Gay."
161 In considering whether suppression of this message was justified or
whether it  violated the First Amendment protection of  speech, Judge
Posner observed that "one of  the concerns expressed by the Supreme
Court in Morse was the psychological effects of drugs. Imagine the psy-
chological effects i f  the plaintiff wore a T-shirt on which was written
'blacks have lower IsQs than whites' or  'a woman's place is  in the
home .
- 162  
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in which Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority and quoting
from the high court's 1995 opinion in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Ac ton,
I63 
r e a
s o n
e d  
t
h
a
t  
"
s
c
h
o
o l  
y
e
a
r
s  
a
r
e  
t
h
e  
t
i
m
e  
w
h
e
n  
t
h
e  
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe."
164 By picking up and then locking on to this language from the major-
ity opinion in Morse referencing the psychological harms caused by ille-
gal drugs, Judge Posner ducks and evades Morse's narrowly drafted con-
currence in which Justice Alito opines that "illegal drug use presents a
grave and in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students.
I therefore conclude that the public schools may ban speech advocating
illegal drug USe."
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Morse o ly on physical harms caused by drug use, not psychological
ones, writing, at one point, that "the special characteristic that is relevant
158. See supra Part 11.A.2 (discussing Beim).
159. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3054
(2007).
160. See supra Part 11.A.3 (discussing Harper).
161. Nusoll, 523 F.3d at 670.
162. Id at 674 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
163. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
164. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Vemonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
165. Id at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
28 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:1
in this case is the threat to the physical safety of students. School atten-
dance can expose students to threats to their physical safety that they
would not otherwise face."
I66 T h i s  
l a n g u a g e  
b y  
J u s t i c
e  
A l i t
o  
o m i
t s  
a n
y
reference to psychological safety; instead, Justice Alito focuses exclu-
sively on physical safety. I f  other courts, however, follow Judge Pos-
ner's lead by focusing on how Morse's majority opinion was concerned,
at least in some small part, with psychological harms as well as physical
ones, then Morse will have a very long reach into the schoolyard. I n
fact, Morse could provide courts like those in Mao11 and Harper with
ample legal justification for  restricting in-school instances o f  hate
speech.
167 In summary, the interpretation of the logic and reasoning in Morse
that transpires in the opinions of Ponce, Boim, Harper, and Mixon sug-
gests that Morse might well provide the legal tool that school administra-
tors need to squelch all manners, modes and varieties of student speech
that portend harm, be it  physical (Ponce and Boim) or psychological
(Harper and Nuxo//). A  brief hypothetical helps to illustrate not only just
how muddled the meaning of Morse has become in light of these cases,
but also just how far both physical and psychological harms possibly can
be stretched to censor student expression under Morse.
Consider a ninth grader who wears a T-shirt displaying the message
"THIN PEOPLE STINK" on the front and the command "EAT TRANS
FATS" on the back. The rather corpulent student in question dons the T-
shirt as a form of political protest because the state or municipality in
which he lives is considering legislation to ban trans fat from school
meals. The student honestly and, perhaps, reasonably believes this is just
one more piece of senseless government regulation that interferes with
what he considers to be personal and private health choices.
168 W h a t ' smore, the student a serts that depriving him of a diet loaded with trans
fats makes him grumpy and mentally distraught, as he suffers mood
swings when denied the ingredients from his normal, everyday diet. This
scenario may not be as far fetched as it initially sounds and, as described
below, it illustrates the extent of the Morse morass created by the lower
166. Id (emphasis added).
167. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 152 (1992) (call-
ing hate speech "the generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks based on race,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation or preference").
168. The hypothetical student is not alone in expressing such a sentiment. I n  a commentary
published in the San Diego Union-Tribune, the president and chief executive of the Pacific Research
Institute openly wondered, "Is i t a proper role of government to tell us what we can or can't eat?"
Sally C. Pipes, Op-Ed., Making Choices About What We Eat, SAN DIEGO UNION-IRIS., Dec. 27,
2007, at B-9. Answering her own query in the negative, Sally C. Pipes argues that "people make
choices. And government should protect—not restrict—the freedom to make those choices so long
as we're not harming others." Id.
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federal courts that have refused to confine the decision to its factual un-
derpinnings of speech advocating illegal drug use.
Initially, it is important to note that the consumption of trans fats by
students in school settings is, in fact, a controversial issue of public con-
cern, much like illegal drug use in Morse. In January 2008, for instance,
the state senate in Virginia unanimously voted "to phase out the use of
artery-clogging trans fats in food sold at public schools, from the cheese
pizza in the cafeteria to the chips in the vending machine."
I69 D u r i n g  t h esame time period, "dozens of municipalities and school systems across
the country have moved to ban or limit trans fats in restaurants and
school cafeterias, including in New York and Philadelphia."
17c1 I n  F e b r u -ary 2008, a measure similar to that in Virginia was considered in Iowa.
171 The issue involved in the hypothetical is clearly political, as law-
makers are, indeed, taking official legislative action with such bills.
Newspaper editorial boards are even weighing in on government meas-
ures.172 This  overt political component, when coupled with the stated
intent of the student in wearing his T-shirt to convey a message of politi-
cal dissent with the "EAT TRANS FATS" slogan, initially seems to sug-
gest that the constitutionality of any effort to ban the T-shirt—a silent,
passive form of expression, much like the black armbands worn by stu-
dents in political protest that were at issue in Tinker—must to be consid-
ered under the Tinker tes t.
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right to wear the T-shirt unless school administrators have real reason to
believe that it would cause a substantial and material disruption of the
educational process or interference with the rights of other students.
But here is where Morse possibly comes into play, at least when it
is expansively interpreted, as it has been by some lower courts. I n  par-
ticular, i f  courts focus on the physical harms suffered by students that
are allegedly caused by ingesting trans fats, as well as on the mental in-
jury and psychological harms that might be sustained by thin or skinny
students who take umbrage and offense at the T-shirt's other message,
"THIN PEOPLE STINK," then a Morse analysis might allow the speech
169. Sandhya Somashekhar & Annie Gowen, Va. Senate Backs Phaseout of  Trans Fats in
School Food, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at B 1 T he  Virginia bill ultimately failed in that state's
house of representatives. How the General Assembly Acted on Major Issues, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2008, at B5.
170. Somashekhar & Gowen, supra note 169, at Bl.
171. See James Q. Lynch, Trans-Fat Bill for Schools on Hold, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa),
Feb. 13, 2008.
172. See, e.g., Editorial, The Trans Fat Transition, ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Feb. 4, 2008, at B6
(setting forth the newspaper's position on a bill in Virginia "to get unhealthful trans fats Out of Vir-
ginia's public school cafeterias and vending machines").
173. See supra note 18 (setting forth the test created by the United States Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
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on both sides of the T-shirt to be summarily squelched without having to
jump through the hoops of Tinker.
Consider first the physical harms issue. The dangers posed to stu-
dents by the consumption of trans fats, like the dangers posed by the use
of illegal drugs at issue in Morse, are both physical and significant. For
instance, the 2008-published Gale Encyclopedia of Diets observes:
Trans fat raises LDL cholesterol in a similar way to saturated fat
and it reduces HDL cholesterol. I t  may also raise blood triglyceride
levels. The combination o f both these effects means that it is most
likely to increase cardiovascular risk. The World Health Organiza-
tion recommends phasing out trans fat in food manufacture and re-
ducing trans fat consumption to no more than I% of dietary energy
or 2.5 g per day.
174The physical impact of trans fats on minors' health has not gone
unnoticed by politicians. When the city of  Baltimore in March 2008
voted to ban trans fats from prepared foods sold in that metropolis, the
bill's sponsor, Agnes Welch, offered the legislation "as part of her effort
to reduce childhood obesity ."
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September 2005 affecting public schools' luncheon menus, California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger remarked that "California is facing an
obesity epidemic. That is why today I am signing into law the most pro-
gressive school nutrition reforms in the nation. This legislation will take
junk food and sodas off the school campuses, and put more fruits and
vegetables into school meals ."
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Chicago Tribune noted more recently in April 2008 when the Illinois
Senate pass d legislation banning trans fat from Illinois schools that par-
ticipate in the state's lunch program:
As the number of reports o f childhood obesity rises, at least eight
states have limited the use o f trans fats in foods, according to the
National Conference o f  State Legislatures. California has an out-
right ban on trans fats in  school meals, and Oregon doesn't let
schools sell snacks with trans fa ts.
177
174. Deborah Lycett, Fats, in THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIETS: A GUIDE TO HEALTH AND
NUTRITION 374, 377 (Jacqueline L. Longe ed., 2007) (emphasis added).
175. John Fritze, City OKs Ban on Trans Fat in '09, BALT. SUN, Mar. 18, 2008, at IA.
176. Press Release, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor Schwarzenegger
Signs Landmark Legislation to Combat Childhood Obesity (Sept. 15, 2005) (emphasis added),
available at http://gov.ca.goviindes.php?/press-releaseil 424.
177. Ashley Wiehle and Jeffrey Meitrodt, State Senate Passes Ban on Trans Fat in School
Lunches, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.cominewsilocalichi-
legis-18apri 8,1,5060025.story.
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To the extent that municipalities and schools are prohibiting by leg-
islation the use of trans fats in prepared foods, trans fats become illegal
(at least in some settings), just like the illic it drugs with which the Su-
preme Court in Morse was concerned. And, i f  Morse is a case about
preventing physical harm to students who may be influenced by a student
message advocating a dangerous behavior (an admonition to take bong
hits), then similar concerns about preventing physical harm to students
who may be influenced by the message "EAT TRANS FATS" to engage
in the dangerous behavior of consuming them animate the need for cen-
sorship in the hypothetical. Courts would seem to be splitting medical
hairs to call the dangers from smoking pot graver than the multiple
health-related dangers posed by childhood obesity that is caused, in part,
by consumption of trans fats. Additionally, there may be a greater likeli-
hood that students actually would heed the call of the student wearing the
"EAT TRANS FATS" T-shirt, given the affordability and accessibility of
food items when compared with marijuana. F inally , "EAT TRANS
FATS" is a much clearer call and directive to engage in unhealthy behav-
ior than is the more muddled marijuana message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus."
But the Morse muddle does not necessarily end here. In  particular,
if  a court focuses on the concurrence of Justice Alito, in which he makes
it clear that he and Justice Kennedy would have protected Joseph Freder-
ick's speech if  it could "plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue,"
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"EAT TRANS FATS" might be protected under Morse, given that the
student expressly claims to be making a political statement. T inker
would again, then, seem to be the appropriate judicial standard for de-
termining protection of the speech. A l l  of this illustrates, of course, just
how complicated and complex Morse becomes when courts untether the
case from both its peculiar facts and the limiting language of Justice Ali-
to's concurrence.
But the judicial inquiry would still not end there. T h e  "THIN
PEOPLE STINK" message, considered on its face, could cause emo-
tional and psychological harm to some gangly youths, in that awkward
phase of adolescence. The message may not question or deride one's
sexual orientation, as do the messages at issue in both Harper and
Nuxoll, but the opinions in those cases do not confine their interpreta-
tions and understanding of Morse to such homophobic expression. I n
particular, it will be recalled that Judge Houston wrote in the following
Harper:
178. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Mao, J., concurring).
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Morse a f fi r m s  that school officials have a duty to protect stu-
dents, as young as fourteen and fifteen years of age, from degrading
acts or expressions that promote injury to the student's physical,
emotional or psychological well-being and development which, in
turn, adversely impacts the school's mission to educate thern.
179This reasoning regarding the Morse holding seems to allow schools
to censor the T-shirt's "THIN PEOPLE STINK" message because of the
potential for emotional and/or psychological harm it could cause to thin
students.
It would be rather odd, of course, for a court to consider the scope
of protection for the message conveyed on one side of a T-shirt under a
different judicial standard from its evaluation of the message stated on
the other side of the T-shirt. But this well could be the case if  the mes-
sage "EAT TRANS FATS" is considered political and thus measured by
Tinker, while the message "THIN PEOPLE STINK" is viewed as caus-
ing emotional harm and thus can be punished under Morse. And, just to
further muddy and complicate the hypothetical, imagine the word
"STINK" is replaced on the T-shirt by the word "SUCK." A t  least one
federal court has held that the word "suck," even when it is used as a
clear statement of disapproval, "derives from a sexual connotation of
oral-genital contac r
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the Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fras r.
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ruled in Broussard v. School Board of the City of Norfolk
183 t h a t  s c h o o lofficials were entitled to censor a T-shirt carrying the anti-drug message
"Drugs Suck !"
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est in protecting their young students from exposure to vulgar and offen-
179. Harper Reconsideration Order, supra note 30, at 9.
180. Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (ED. Va. 1992).
181.Id
182.478 U.S. 675, 675-85 (1986) (allowing a school to punish a student who made a sexually
suggestive speech to a captive audience of fellow students during a student-government assembly,
and holding that "it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse" because to allow such speech would "undermine the
school's basic educational mission").
183. 801 F. Supp. 1526 (ED. Va. 1992).
184. As described by the court in Broussard, the student in question:
bought a concert T-shirt at a concert of a pop music group, New Kids on the Block. The
shirt was black with white lettering. On the front of the shirt, printed in letters approxi-
mately eight inches in height, were the words "Drugs Suck!" On the back of the shirt was
printed "NKOTB Donnie Wahlberg," referring to the group New Kids on the Block and
its leader.
Id at 1528.
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sive language."
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SUCK" on the hypothetical T-shirt could be censored either under Morse
(as interpreted by the courts in Harper and Nuxoll) or Fraser (as inter-
preted in Broussard).
Ultimately, this hypothetical illustrates that Morse has done little to
clarify free-speech jurisprudence in the realm of  public schools, espe-
cially when the case is interpreted broadly. And when courts so choose
to expansively construe Morse, they give school officials another weapon
in their censorship arsenal—a very powerful one that allows them, as it
did in Ponce, to sidestep the more rigorous Tinker analysis in order to
quickly and effectively squelch speech. Morse, of course, had nothing to
do with either the consumption of trans fats or the injured feelings of thin
youngsters, but the seemingly silly hypothetical above demonstrates how
the case could, indeed, be made applicable to such subjects under the
reasoning of post-Morse opinions like Ponce, Boim, Harper, and Nuxoll.
V. CONCLUSION
When is a case about bong hits not a case about bong hits? The an-
swer, in brief, is when it is broadly interpreted as a case about harm,
safety, and danger.
That appears to be the early lesson learned from the judicial deci-
sions rendered since the Supreme Court decided Morse v. Frederick in
June 2007. This  Article has demonstrated how several courts have had
no problem in selectively pulling language from Morse, either from the
majority opinion (as in Nuxoll) or from the Alito-Kennedy concurrence
(as in Ponce), to support censorship of student expression that is far re-
moved from speech advocating illegal drug use. Today, Morse is being
used as a case that supports censorship of speech that allegedly reveals
the state of mind of a student to engage in violence (as in Ponce and
Boim), as well as censorship of anti-gay speech that might cause emo-
tional and psychological harm to those who read it (as in Harper and
Nuxo//).
This Article has illustrated not only how the opinions of Ponce,
Boim, Harper, and Nuxoll abuse Morse by taking the opinion far beyond
both its peculiar facts and the limiting language in the Alito-Kennedy
concurrence, but also by failing to recognize the dichotomy between
harm to self versus harm to others stemming from student speech. I n
addition, the courts in Ponce and Boim ignored the distinction between
censoring speech because of its potential influence on others' conduct
185. Id. at 1537.
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versus censoring speech because of what it reveals about the speaker's
own state of mind to engage in particular conduct.
Ultimately, when courts in the near future grapple with student
speech referencing violence and violent conduct, the early indications
from post-Morse cases like Ponce and Boim are that judges will read
Morse in the lugubriously long shadows cast by the tragedy at Colum-
bine High School. These opinions, as well as those in the emotional-
harm cases like Harper and Nuxoll, are proving wrong the author's initial
prognostication about the reach of Morse.
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is not nearly as narrow as was initially thought.'"
186. See Calvert & Richards, supra note 8, at 26.
187. See supra notes 5-8 (describing and setting forth views that the ruling in Morse was a
narrow victory for schools).
